Special Issue on South Asia and Theories of Nuclear Deterrence
Guest Editor: E. Sridharan

International Relations Theory and the India-Pakistan Conflict
by E. Sridharan

This paper analyzes the nuclear deterrence relationship between India and Pakistan in the context of a larger political conflict, and in the light of contemporary international relations theory. It finds mainstream deterrence theory and neorealist theory defective as the behavior patterns of India and Pakistan do not fit them in three important ways. It then examines the critiques of neorealist theory applied to the developing world and finds that a combination of a subaltern realist perspective and regional security complex theory best fits the India-Pakistan conflict, including its nuclearization. Lastly, it explores the conditions under which nuclear deterrence in South Asia can lead to a broad-based peace.

International Relations Theory and Minimum Deterrence
by Rajesh M. Basrur

As long as there is no interdependence between states, the use of force will be central to international political life. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by a state depends on its perception of nuclear threats. Hostile relations between nuclear-armed states reflect cross-paradigmatic behavior. States attempt to project force through threats of retaliation (realism), but are simultaneously compelled to cooperate because the risk of nuclear cataclysm makes them interdependent (liberalism).The contradiction between the benefits (deterrence) and risks (nuclear disaster) of nuclear weapons cannot be fully reconciled, but the dilemma can be reduced in intensity by means of minimum deterrence.

Conceptualizing Nuclear Deterrence : Pakistan’s Posture
by Rasul Bakhsh Rais

The article explores Pakistan’s nuclear posture by raising questions about its credibility, sufficiency, and whether or not will it contribute to the strategic stability of the South Asian region. Pakistan’s doctrine rests on the assumption that its ability to effectuate a minimal nuclear deterrence in dynamic sense would be the best guarantee of security against a vastly more powerful India. The central premise of this article is that while the logic of rationality holds in South Asia as well, the presence of nuclear weapons by themselves may not be a sufficient guarantee of averting war in future if other determinants of security are not taken care of.

South Asia: The Irrelevance of Classical Nuclear Deterrence Theory
by Bharat Karnad

Nuclear deterrence theory, featuring near equal powers and positing symmetrical
consequences of nuclear hostilities, is based principally on the US-USSR confrontation
during the Cold War. Except for the theorizing by the French Army Generals Pierre Gallois and Andre Beaufre to provide a rationale for France’s force de frappe, there has been little thinking about nuclear deterrence between two states differing vastly in size and resources. This paper analyzes the weaknesses in the classical nuclear deterrence concepts and the Gallois-Beaufre theories generally in terms of their inapplicability to India-Pakistan wars, crises and nuclear conflict scenarios. It argues that factors other than deterrence are at work, like the sentiments of a partitioned Muslim community, kinship ties, shared ethnicity and culture, and the growing clout of the Indian Muslim voter. What has evolved is a unique system of restraints and conflict containment despite gross disparities between India and Pakistan.

The Threat of Unintended Use of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia
by Rajesh Rajagopalan

Proliferation pessimists argue that the threat of nuclear weapons use between India and Pakistan encompass not only the possibility of these weapons being used deliberately, but also of their inadvertent use. This includes several contingencies, including the possibility of nuclear weapons being used due to inadvertent escalation of conventional military crisis or war, of use without proper authorization from the political leadership, the theft of nuclear weapons by a terrorist group or disgruntled elements within the military, and of nuclear accidents. Several features of the India-Pakistan nuclear dyad add to these dangers: the proximity of the two adversaries, the state of civil-military relations (particularly in Pakistan), the nature of the command and control systems in the region and the presumed weaknesses of the safety system on Indian and Pakistani nuclear devices. This essay argues that such arguments overlook the importance of nuclear doctrines in the region, which minimizes the effect of many of these concerns.